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BEYOND TRAINING PROSECUTORS ABOUT THEIR
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS: CAN PROSECUTORS'




Prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, judges, and legal
academics from around the country recently met at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law in New York to discuss prosecutors' compliance
with their disclosure obligations.' The overarching question was how
prosecutors' offices could do a better job. To assist representatives of
the legal profession in approaching this question from new directions,
the Symposium organizers invited speakers from outside the legal
profession to talk about the causes of error and methods used to reduce
error in other contexts. One of the themes was that, outside the practice
of law, individuals and institutions learn from their mistakes. This
Article considers whether prosecutors' offices can identify and learn
from their lawyers' disclosure mistakes.
INTRODUCTION
Early in President Obama's term, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) acknowledged a big mistake and promised to learn from it.
Senior federal prosecutors in the DOJ's Public Integrity Section had
secured the indictment of a sitting U.S. Senator-Ted Stevens. The
prosecutors put the Senator to the expense, time, and anxiety of lengthy
proceedings that culminated in a guilty verdict-and influenced the
course of an election-only to have the case dismissed after it was
revealed that the prosecutors had withheld crucial evidence supporting
* Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics,
Fordham University School of Law.
I Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really
Works?, 31 CARDOzO L. REv. 1943 (2010).
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the Senator's defense and contradicting the prosecution's key witness.
Prior to the sentencing, the DOJ admitted that the prosecutors failed to
comply with their constitutional obligation to disclose favorable
evidence to the accused and decided not to retry the case.2  The DOJ
also resolved to rethink its disclosure policies and practices.3
The DOJ was motivated to pledge a reevaluation of discovery
practices by its awareness that the Ted Stevens prosecution was only
one in a series of federal criminal cases in which it was embarrassed by
its lawyers' discovery failures. A similar failure previously plagued one
of the biggest federal environmental prosecutions in history-a
prosecution blaming executives of W.R. Grace Co. for decades of
dangerous environmental abuses. The trial court ultimately instructed
the jury that the DOJ lawyers had failed to meet their obligation to
disclose evidence to the defendants; that and other rulings in response to
the prosecution's discovery failure may have contributed to the jury's
decision to acquit the defendants. 4 In response to another federal
prosecutor's disclosure violation, the U.S. Chief District Judge for the
District of Massachusetts initiated disciplinary proceedings in his own
court, having concluded from past experience that the DOJ was unable
or unwilling to police prosecutors who violated these obligations; 5 the
court's opinion summarized close to seventy published federal court
decisions involving federal prosecutors' nondisclosure or belated
disclosure of discovery material.6 At around the same time, in Miami,
another federal judge awarded substantial monetary damages to a
federal criminal defendant who, the court found, had been victimized by
a range of prosecutorial misconduct, not the least of which involved
disclosure violations. 7
2 Motion of the United States to Set Aside the Verdict and Dismiss the Indictment with
Prejudice, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2009). See generally Neil A.
Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in the Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at Al.
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Attorney
General David W. Ogden at His Installation Ceremony (May 8, 2009) ("A team of senior
prosecutors and Department officials-under the direction of Assistant Attorney General Lanny
Breuer and Karin Immergut, Chair of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee of US
Attorneys-are reviewing discovery practices in criminal matters and will recommend any
necessary improvements.").
4 See Gregory F. Linsin, "A Cancerous Effect on the Administration of Justice"--What Can
Be Done About the Rash of Flagrant DOJ Discovery Violations?, MONDAQ, July 1, 2009,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=82080.
5 United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009). In a subsequent decision, the
court held that sanctions against the prosecutor were not necessary or appropriate. Among the
reasons given, the court noted that in the aftermath of the incident, the prosecutor was contrite
and furthered her education on the subject of discovery obligations, and that the United States
Attorneys' Office also implemented significant new initiatives. United States v. Jones, 686 F.
Supp. 2d 147 (D. Mass. 2010).
6 620 F. Supp. 2d at 185-93.
7 United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Other recent examples
have been reported as well. See, e.g., Linsin, supra note 4 (reporting that in June 2009, the DOJ
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In January 2010, based on the recommendations of its discovery
working group, the DOJ unveiled a series of new initiatives. 8 A
principal product of the DOJ's study was a commitment to educate
federal prosecutors more rigorously regarding their disclosure duties. 9
Having previously called upon federal prosecutors' offices to designate
discovery coordinators, the DOJ now called on the coordinators to
provide annual training to their offices and "serve as on-location
advisors,"' 0 and announced that it would develop resources for
prosecutors regarding discovery." The DOJ appointed a new national
coordinator for criminal discovery initiatives to oversee the educational
efforts and other initiatives. 12 The pedagogic focus presupposes that
one important explanation for why federal prosecutors sometimes fail to
comply with their disclosure obligations is that they are unaware of the
relevant law, misunderstand it, misapply it, or do not know how to
implement it.
The assumption that without adequate training, federal prosecutors
will not adequately understand their minimal legal obligations, seems
fair given that federal prosecutors' disclosure obligations have many
moved in two Ninth Circuit cases, United States v. Kohring and United States v. Kott, to remand
the cases and release the defendants because "it had uncovered information that should have been,
but was not, disclosed to the appellants prior to trial"); Del Quentin Wilber, Justice Dept. Wants
Charges Against Mexican Man Dropped, WASH. POST, June 23, 2009, at B04 (reporting the
DOJ's motion to dismiss charges against reputed international drug dealer after the district court
criticized federal prosecutors for discovery failures).
8 See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memo
re Criminal Discovery], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/
title9/crm0065.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the
Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case Management Working Group (Jan. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Ogden Memo re Summary of Actions], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/
dag-memo.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Department Litigating Components Handling Criminal Matters [and] All United States
Attorneys, Requirement for Office Discovery Policies in Criminal Matters (Jan. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Ogden Memo re Requirement for Office Discovery Policies], available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-to-usas-component-heads.pdf.
9 Mike Scarcella, DOJ Outlines Changes After Backlash over Handling of Stevens Case,
LAW.COM, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434690374 (reporting that
in an October 13, 2009 speech, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer announced plans for
"mandatory annual discovery training for all [federal] prosecutors and the creation of a new
position at Main Justice that will focus on discovery issues" while also vowing that "the
department would fight any effort to require prosecutors to turn over all favorable information to
the defense").
10 Ogden Memo re Summary of Actions, supra note 8, at 3.
11 Id. at 3-4.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Announces National
Coordinator for Criminal Discovery Initiatives (Jan. 15, 2010). The responsibilities of the
national coordinator are to include creating an online directory of resources on discovery, to
produce a handbook on discovery and case management, to implement training for agents and
paralegals, and to oversee a project to develop electronic storage of, and access to, investigative
materials. Id.
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sources and their scope is uncertain or contested in various respects. 13
For example, the prosecutors in the Ted Stevens prosecution failed to
comply with the constitutional minimum, as established by Brady v.
Maryland14 and subsequent decisions. These decisions provide as a
matter of due process that the prosecution generally must turn over
certain evidence and other information favorable to the defense, whether
because the information tends to establish the defendant's innocence or
because it tends to undermine the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses. 15 However, despite the passage of many years since Brady
was decided, its scope remains contested. For example, the Supreme
Court has said that due process has been violated only when prosecutors
failed to turn over favorable evidence that was "material." But courts
disagree about what materiality means and how much the concept
narrows prosecutors' legal obligations; 16 at best, the concept can be
elaborated only in vague terms that leave much to the judgment of
prosecutors and courts. In federal criminal prosecutions, federal statutes
and rules of criminal procedure also establish disclosure obligations,
and in some districts, local court rules and/or rules of professional
conduct also do so, augmenting as well as overlapping with the federal
constitutional dictates. 17  The scope of some of these additional
obligations is also unclear. 18 Ultimately, judicial approaches to
discovery vary among the federal district courts. 19
13 See infra Part I.C and accompanying text.
14 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
15 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
16 Compare, e.g., United States v. Naegele, 468 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) ("The
government is obligated to disclose all evidence relating to guilt or punishment which might be
reasonably considered favorable to the defendant's case, that is, all favorable evidence that is
itself admissible or that is likely to lead to favorable evidence that would be admissible, or that
could be used to impeach a prosecution witness." (citing United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D.
12, 17 (D.D.C. 2005))), with Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006) ("Materiality is
an issue at the time that the prosecutor makes a determination regarding what he must disclose to
the defense .... ). The DOJ sides with the narrowest reading of prosecutors' constitutional
duties. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001(B)(1) (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-yeading-roorn/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm; infra note 26;
see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v.
Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002) (arguing that Brady has minimal pretrial
significance because of the stringency of the "materiality" standard).
17 See generally LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TREATMENT OF BRADY V.
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS' RULES, ORDERS, AND
POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (2004).
18 At the Symposium, participants who examined the scope of prosecutors' disclosure
obligations noted the importance of clear statutory provisions. See, e.g., New Perspectives on
Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2016 (2010) [hereinafter Report of the Working Groups].
19 See generally HOOPER ET AL., supra note 17, at 6-16.
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State prosecutors are in a similar position. They have to comply
not only with the federal constitutional obligations but with disclosure
obligations established by state constitutional decisions, statutes,
procedural rules, 20 and/or ethics rules.2 ' For example, many state laws
require prosecutors to disclose various writings and physical evidence.
Typically, these include written and recorded statements of the
prosecution's witnesses, writings and physical evidence that the
prosecution intends to offer at trial, relevant laboratory reports, and
statements of the accused. 22  The specific materials that must be
disclosed may contain some but not necessarily all Brady information in
a case. They almost certainly will include much material that is not
covered by Brady but that will nevertheless be important to defense
counsel for purposes of advising the defendant, investigating, preparing
for trial, and/or presenting a defense.
Prosecutors' offices often adopt internal discovery policies
regarding disclosure-for example, policies establishing the process by
which prosecutors in the office should comply with their legal
obligations; or policies calling on prosecutors to disclose more evidence
and information, or to make disclosure sooner, than the law requires.23
Prosecutors must comply with these additional disclosure obligations.
Although the failure to do so will have no legal consequences for the
prosecution in a criminal proceeding, they may subject prosecutors to
formal or informal sanction in the workplace. Internal policies on
disclosure are ordinarily intended to reduce the risk that prosecutors will
violate their legal obligations. Thus, an important question is how well
20 See Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 1962-63.
21 Most states have a rule corresponding to Rule 3.8(d) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Supreme Court has assumed that the rule is more demanding than the
constitutional obligation. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) ("Although the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the
disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may
arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations."). Several state courts
seem to disagree, however. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130
(Ohio 2010) (declining to construe the rule "as requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady
and [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16] require"); ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 at 4 n.18 (2009) [hereinafter ABA Opinion 09-454]
(citing cases and discussing the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence and information favorable
to the defense). Recently, the ABA's ethics committee issued an opinion concluding that, in
several respects, the rule is significantly more demanding than constitutional doctrine. See
generally ABA Opinion 09-454, supra. However, there is no evidence that courts generally hold
prosecutors to the potentially stricter dictates of their jurisdictions' disciplinary rule. The DOJ
policy makes only passing reference to the ethics rules governing prosecutorial disclosure and
guides federal prosecutors to take a more conservative approach to disclosure than the one
required by the ethics rules both on their face and as interpreted by the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001 (U.S. Dep't of
Justice 2010); see also Ogden Memo re Criminal Discovery, supra note 8, at 1.
22 See Report of the Working Groups, supra notel8, at 1966-67.
23 See id. at 2025 (concluding that prosecutors' offices should promulgate written guidelines
governing discovery that address both what must be disclosed and the process of disclosure).
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they serve that objective and whether it is possible to improve the
efficacy of policies without unduly sacrificing other law enforcement
interests. Disclosure policies may promote other objectives as well,
including: (1) the interest in promoting fair outcomes; (2) the interest in
promoting public and judicial confidence in the office's fairness; and
(3) particularly in the case of liberal disclosure policies, the office's
administrative interest in encouraging early resolutions of criminal
cases by enabling defendants to size up the cases against them at an
early stage and make rational decisions, where appropriate, to plead
guilty.
On the more generous side, some prosecutors' offices have "open
file" disclosure policies permitting the defense to examine or reproduce
all of the documents in the prosecutor's case file. 24 Other offices have
policies that augment prosecutors' legal obligations far less generously.
Still others may leave it to prosecutors, as a matter of individual
autonomy, whether to disclose more than the law demands, and many
prosecutors undoubtedly do so--either consistently with the Supreme
Court's admonition to avoid "tacking too close to the wind"25 or simply
as a matter of administrative ease.
Prior to its new discovery initiatives, the DOJ's internal policy
took a comparatively stingy approach. It now encourages prosecutors to
err on the side of disclosure whenever they are uncertain whether
evidence is "material" for purposes of constitutional case law26 and
24 See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 21, at 6 n.30; Warren Diepraam, Prosecutorial
Misconduct: It Is Not the Prosecutor's Way, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 773, 780 (2006) ("In addition to
broad discovery rights, most jurisdictions across the state [of Texas] have open-file policies
whereby the defense lawyer is allowed access to, and in many cases copies of, the prosecution's
evidence."). At the Symposium, Hon. Charles J. Hynes, the District Attorney of Kings County,
New York, and John Chisholm, the District Attorney of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, discussed their
offices' "open file" policies. See Hon. Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Att'y, Kings County, New York,
Presentation at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium: New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works? (Nov. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Hynes Presentation]
(transcript on file with the Cardozo Law Review); Voices from the Field: An Inter-Professional
Approach to Managing Critical Information, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2037, 2074 (2010)
[hereinafter Voices from the Field] (presentation by John Chisholm).
25 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995); accord Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15
("As we have often observed, the prudent prosecutor will err on the side of transparency,
resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.").
26 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001(B)(1) (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2010) ("Exculpatory
and impeachment evidence is material to a finding of guilt-and thus the Constitution requires
disclosure-when there is a reasonable probability that effective use of the evidence will result in
an acquittal. Recognizing that it is sometimes difficult to assess the materiality of evidence
before trial, prosecutors generally must take a broad view of materiality and err on the side of
disclosing exculpatory and impeaching evidence. While ordinarily, evidence that would not be
admissible at trial need not be disclosed, this policy encourages prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure if admissibility is a close question." (citations omitted)). This guideline is undercut,
however, by caution against over-disclosure. See id. § 9-5.001(A) ("The policy, however,
recognizes that other interests, such as witness security and national security, are also critically
important, and that if disclosure prior to trial might jeopardize these interests, disclosure may be
2166 [Vol. 31:6
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generally to comply with the constitutional obligation as soon as
possible.27 DOJ policy also calls for some disclosure of information
beyond the constitutional and legal minimum. In general, it requires
disclosure of information that is "inconsistent" with the charged crime
or that "casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy" of the
prosecution's evidence regardless of whether the information is likely to
lead to an acquittal. 28 This requires far less disclosure, however, than
that required by the analogous ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct or ABA Standard for Criminal Justice, which, in the ABA's
understanding, call for disclosure of information favorable to the
defense. 29 The DOJ standard also requires less disclosure than state
prosecutorial policies that call upon prosecutors to open their case files
to the defense regularly, thereby disclosing witness interview reports
and other material that might be principally inculpatory but whose early
disclosure might help the defense size up the case and better prepare for
trial.30 Compliance with the DOJ's policy might reduce the risk of
error, legal challenges, and criticism, but to a far lesser degree than an
open file policy. Where internal policy calls, at a minimum, for caution,
a prosecutor who withholds evidence in close cases will have made an
error of judgment and have departed from internal regulatory policy-
even if at the end of the day he or she has not broken the law.
The DOJ "guidance" issued in January 2010 does not purport to
establish new disclosure obligations 3' but elaborates on existing
guidelines regarding the procedures by which individual prosecutors
should gather and review potentially discoverable information. 32 Rather
delayed or restricted .... " (citation omitted)); id. § 9-5.001(C) ("The policy recognizes, however,
that a trial should not involve the consideration of information which is irrelevant or not
significantly probative of the issues before the court and should not involve spurious issues or
arguments which serve to divert the trial process from examining the genuine issues. Information
that goes only to such matters does not advance the purpose of a trial and thus is not subject to
disclosure.").
27 See id. § 9-5.001(D).
28 Id. § 9-5.001(C).
29 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2008); STANDARDS FOR CRIMrNAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION § 3-3.11 (a) (3d ed. 1993); ABA Opinion
09-454, supra note 21, at 4 ("Rule 3.8(d) is more demanding than the constitutional case law, in
that it requires the disclosure of evidence or information favorable to the defense without regard
to the anticipated impact of the evidence or information on a trial's outcome."); see generally
supra note 21 (discussing state versions of Rule 3.8(d)).
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing open file policies).
31 Ogden Memo re Requirement for Office Discovery Policies, supra note 8, at I.
32 Ogden Memo re Criminal Discovery, supra note 8, at 1-4. Interestingly, while recognizing
that federal prosecutors' disclosure obligations derive from various sources, such as constitutional
law, the Jencks Act, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, and local rules of the district court,
the new guidance does not acknowledge that federal prosecutors may have additional obligations
under rules of professional conduct. The omission is striking because the Supreme Court and the
ABA have recently expressed the view that rules of professional conduct modeled on Rule 3.8(d)
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct place additional discovery obligations on
prosecutors. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) ("Although the Due Process
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than establishing a uniform approach to disclosure by federal
prosecutors and their offices, the DOJ directs offices to establish
discovery policies with which its prosecutors should comply-subject
to exceptions in individual cases33-while noting that most offices
already had such policies that could simply be reaffirmed or
formalized. 34
Beyond that, the DOJ generally leaves it to the discretion of
individual prosecutors and their offices whether to disclose more, or
disclose sooner, than the disclosure law and the DOJ policy require. 35
Further, its guidance seemingly pushes prosecutors in opposite
directions regarding whether to take a liberal or conservative approach
as a matter of discretion. While encouraging prosecutors "to provide
discovery broader and more comprehensive than the discovery
obligations" in order to promote truth seeking, foster speedy resolutions,
and provide a margin of error, the guidance also enumerates"countervailing considerations"-such as the need to protect victims
and witnesses, protect witnesses' privacy, prevent obstruction, enhance
access to reciprocal discovery, and promote other strategic interests-
that militate against liberal disclosure. 36  On the liberal side, the
guidance generally calls upon prosecutors to have an agent memorialize
witness interviews (without specifying how detailed the agent's notes
should be) and requires memorialization and disclosure of "[m]aterial
variances in a witness's statements. '37 On the conservative side, it
provides that "[t]rial preparation meetings with witnesses generally
need not be memorialized, ' 38 and the guidance is expressly agnostic as
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of
material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more
broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations." (citing, inter alia, Rule 3.8(d)));
ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 21. Insofar as professional conduct rules are more demanding,
federal prosecutors would be expected to comport with them since federal prosecutors are
statutorily obligated by the McDade Amendment to comply with the professional conduct rules of
the states in which they practice. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The
Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000) (discussing the history and
questioning the wisdom of the McDade Amendment).
33 Ogden Memo re Requirement for Office Discovery Policies, supra note 8, at 2.
34 Id. To the extent that the DOJ regarded the status quo as inadequate, one might question
the idea that U.S. Attorney's Offices should simply reaffirm or memorialize prior policies.
35 Ogden Memo re Criminal Discovery, supra note 8, at 6. An exception is that the guidance
requires disclosure of exculpatory information "reasonably promptly after discovery." Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 5. The policy does not provide guidance about when variances between statements
given by a witness at different meetings or at different times in a single meeting are "material."
Further, unless prosecutors require agents to take detailed notes, prosecutors may fail to recall
inconsistent statements given to the prosecutor at different points in time and may be entirely
unaware of inconsistent statements given to the agents outside the prosecutor's presence.
38 Id. The distinction between a witness interview and trial preparation is not necessarily
clear or meaningful as a matter of actual practice. Presumably, interviews conducted prior to an
indictment comprise witness interviews. Prosecutors may be tempted to regard post-indictment
interviews as trial preparation, but that will not always be a fair characterization. For example, if
[Vol. 31:62168
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to whether reports of witness interviews must be disclosed.39 One can
posit that given discretion, in order to enhance the likelihood of
securing a conviction if the case goes to trial, most federal prosecutors
will hew closely to the legal minimum rather than making generous
disclosure.40
The question for the DOJ as well as for state prosecutors' offices
seeking to facilitate discovery compliance is whether current policies,
modes of training, levels of oversight, and the like are enough, or
whether prosecutors' offices should amend their policies regarding
when, how, and how much disclosure should be made, or adopt other
reforms. Almost certainly, some federal and state prosecutors fail to
meet their disclosure obligations for reasons other than, or in addition
to, inadequate knowledge of the law and office policy. 41 If this is so,
then office-wide education may be necessary but not sufficient to
address why prosecutors--even well-intentioned ones-might lapse. It
may be useful, additionally, to direct prosecutors to make considerably
broader or earlier disclosure than required by law; to reallocate
responsibility for disclosure; to develop checklists or other methods to
facilitate prosecutors' compliance; 42 to develop better methods of
the prosecutor has not previously met with a potential witness and is not certain what testimony
the witness will give, it seems fairer to view the meeting as a witness interview. But the
prosecutor may adopt the alternative characterization to avoid note-taking.
39 Id. at 5.
40 Consider, for example, a scenario in which the prosecutor meets with a cooperating
defendant on several occasions and fairly anticipates from the start that the cooperator's account
will evolve over the course of the meetings. A prosecutor who took a generous approach to
disclosure would have an investigator take virtually verbatim notes and disclose the notes to the
defense for its use in cross-examining the cooperator. But, wholly apart from concerns about
obstruction of justice or witness safety, many prosecutors will be disinclined to make such
disclosure in the name of fair process, precisely because the defense may make effective use of
the disparate accounts to suggest that the cooperator's trial testimony is fabricated. Instead, if the
meetings take place after the target of the investigation is indicted, the prosecutor will likely
regard the meetings as preparatory for trial and direct the investigator at the meeting not to take
notes at all. To the extent the cooperator's account evolves, the prosecutor may not recall all the
inconsistencies and omissions and may be inclined to regard inconsistencies as immaterial.
41 They may lack the knowledge of investigative agency practices and policies, or the
necessary skill, to obtain from their investigators information that must be disclosed. They may
be sloppy in keeping, filing, and reviewing material in their possession. They may make
disclosure a relatively low priority, in order to preserve time for other tasks. They may
rationalize non-disclosure out of fear that defense lawyers will use information to thwart a
deserved conviction. They may take their obligations lightly because they perceive that
violations are unlikely to be discovered and to have adverse consequences for them or the case.
They may be acculturated to believe that scrupulous compliance is unnecessary and not valued.
See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 685,
715-22 (2006) ("[P]rosecutors have increasingly sought to avoid and subvert the requirements of
Brady."). Any prosecutor's office or individual prosecutor has room for improvement when it
comes to disclosure.
42 Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 1973-74 (suggesting that to redress
inadequacies in current disclosure practices, "each jurisdiction should adopt a rule requiring use
of checklists to ensure full and timely transfer of all relevant information from police to
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supervision and internal regulation;43 to improve office culture;44 or to
take other institutional measures to enhance the office's compliance
with the disclosure law, including the development of technology for
electronically storing and accessing investigative material, 45 which the
DOJ is now exploring. 46
An obvious starting point for improving institutional practices
would be to identify and acknowledge disclosure errors and attempt to
understand why prosecutors committed them.47 Learning from
mistakes, a common educational strategy, is often employed
advantageously by businesses, and can also be used by professionals
seeking to improve their work processes. 48 For example, medical
professionals and institutions can examine cases of possible medical
error (e.g., prescribing or administering the wrong medication or
causing preventable infections) and look for ways to prevent their
recurrence, whether through greater care by individuals or by the
adoption of systems designed to reduce error on an institutional level. 49
The DOJ does not appear to be undertaking a systematic study of
federal prosecutors' discovery errors for purposes of improving
disclosure practices and policies. Nor does it appear that individual
U.S. Attorneys' Offices or more than a few state prosecutors' offices
have instituted processes for learning from discovery error or from
mistakes in general. Why not?
Part I of this Article suggests a host of reasons why the DOJ and
state prosecutors' offices might profess doubt about the value of
studying disclosure errors for the purpose of improving internal
prosecutors"); id. at 2016-20 (discussing utility of a "discovery 'checklist' for the prosecutor's
office). See generally ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2009) (detailing the use of
checklists to reduce medical error in hospitals).
43 See Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 1992 ("Supervision is another
important yet often overlooked tool for improving prosecutorial discovery practices.").
44 See id. at 1996 ("[P]rosecutors cannot rely on systems alone. Culture needs to reinforce
systems, and vice versa.... [O]nly a deeper commitment to the values that support disclosure
will accomplish the goal of full compliance.").
45 See id. at 2005.
46 Ryan J. Reilly, Justice Department Requests Millions to Beef Up E-Discovery Capabilities,
MAIN JUSTICE, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/02/17/justice-department-
requests-millions-for-e-discovery/.
47 Cf Erik Luna, System Failure, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (2005) ("[T]o address the
full breadth of errors that produce wrongful convictions, it may take a more comprehensive view
of the criminal process and its systemic failure to protect the innocent."); see also Lawton P.
Cummings, Can an Ethical Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor? A Social Cognitive Approach to
Systemic Reform, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 2139, 2156 (2010) (arguing that prosecutorial misconduct
may result from prosecutors' moral disengagement, which can be reduced by such reforms as
"community prosecution" and prosecutorial review boards).
48 Voices from the Field, supra note 24, at 2038-56 (presentation by Dr. Gordon Schiff).
49 See Peter E. Rivard et al., Enhancing Patient Safety Through Organizational Learning: Are
Patient Safety Indicators a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1633 (2006).
See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
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practices. It finds none of these wholly convincing. Part II identifies
challenges that prosecutors' offices would likely face in designing and
implementing a process of identifying, studying, and learning from
disclosure errors.
I. WHY MIGHT PROSECUTORS BE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
FOR LEARNING FROM DISCLOSURE MISTAKES?
Hospitals have been urged to examine cases where patients may
have been poorly treated in order to understand whether avoidable
errors were made and, if so, to take steps to prevent similar errors in the
future. 50 It seems obvious that prosecutors' offices could reduce the risk
of disclosure errors by undertaking comparable inquiries. Participants
at the Symposium were offered the example of the office of Dallas
prosecutor Craig Watkins. Following his election, he established a unit
to examine the integrity of convictions obtained by his predecessor,
starting with capital cases. The unit concluded that many convicted
defendants were innocent and helped secure their freedom.51 In the
process, the office made efforts to determine how and why it had
convicted innocent people. It built on what it learned to redesign its
internal processes with the aim of reducing the risk of convicting
innocent people in the future.52 A handful of other offices may also
have formal processes designed to examine prosecutors' mistakes with
an eye toward internal reform. 53 It is uncertain whether any
prosecutor's office focuses especially on disclosure error.
One can imagine a host of reasons (as opposed to justifications) for
why prosecutors' offices would hesitate to look systematically at cases
in which individual prosecutors may have failed to comply with
disclosure obligations established by law and office policy. Like most
other lawyers, prosecutors tend to be skeptical. They may doubt the
value of taking time away from other work to dissect potential mistakes
that put them under a microscope. Like the legal profession generally,
prosecutors' offices also tend to be conservative, and may therefore
resist doing things differently. Prosecutors tend to be concerned about
their public images. They may worry that measures instituted to look at
possible mistakes will be viewed as an admission that they are imperfect
50 See note 49 and accompanying text.
51 See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 494-95 (2009) (discussing work of Dallas
prosecutor's Conviction Integrity Unit).
52 Voices from the Field, supra note 24, at 2069-74 (presentation by Terri Moore).
53 At the Symposium, Hon. Charles Hynes, the District Attorney of Kings County, New
York, reported that his office had such a policy. Hynes Presentation, supra note 24.
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or unfair. Prosecutors, even those in administrative positions, generally
come up the ranks without training in administration and supervision.
They may not be confident in their ability to examine potential error and
implement reform in a manner that is productive and not demoralizing,
and they lack models of how to do so.
Medical professionals undoubtedly have similar concerns, 54 in
addition to others of their own. In particular, while individual
prosecutors and their offices are well protected from civil liability,55
doctors and their workplaces are very much susceptible to malpractice
liability. However, medical professionals are said to be able to
overcome these concerns. When patients suffer or die because of
possible medical error, hospitals can ascertain whether the harm was
avoidable and, if so, seek ways to avoid such harms in the future. Done
right, the institutional practice may contribute to a culture in which
medical professionals are open to learning from mistakes. Medical
professionals certainly have other important work to do, and they
undoubtedly care about their professional reputations as well as the risk
of malpractice liability. But reviewing cases where mistakes may have
been made may be worth the effort, not only by leading to better
individual and institutional practices, but also by enhancing the
institutional culture.
One key difference between learning from medical error and
learning from prosecutors' disclosure error is the nature of the mistakes
in question and their relationship to the respective professionals'
perceived mission. The doctor's role is to heal the sick, not make them
worse. When doctors make mistakes that kill or otherwise harm clients,
they achieve the very opposite of what they are fundamentally seeking
to accomplish. This is not the case when prosecutors withhold
discovery.
On an emotional level, many prosecutors probably regard their
fundamental mission to be convicting guilty people.56 But this is not
true on an intellectual level. Most prosecutors would acknowledge that
54 Although there is far more available education and training in hospital administration than
prosecutorial administration (or in the administration of law offices generally), medical
professionals presumably share prosecutors' interest in their public image and in using time
productively.
55 See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11
(2009) (describing prosecutorial immunity from civil liability).
56 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 44 (2009) ("The minister-
of-justice concept-while noble in theory-has not always translated seamlessly into practice at
the trial level in light of the reality of prosecutorial culture and its organizational pressures. A
series of factors cause trial prosecutors to view their jobs primarily through the lens of gaining'wins' (convictions) and avoiding 'losses' (acquittals)."); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment,
It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping
Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 291 (2001).
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their job also includes weeding out cases where individuals are not
guilty, 57 as well as cases where a conviction would be unduly harsh. 58
Likewise, they would acknowledge that their objective to convict some
of the guilty is qualified by the duty to do so consistently with legal
processes. 59 But fundamentally, disclosure in itself is not a core mission
and may not be considered intrinsic to prosecutors' core missions. 60 On
the contrary, in the perception of many prosecutors, obligatory
disclosure may frustrate their objectives by arming defense lawyers with
information that can be used to obtain acquittals of defendants whom
the prosecutors believe to be guilty and who most often are in fact
guilty.61 If prosecutors were to endeavor to learn from any of their
errors, their preference would probably be to learn from investigative,
strategic, and forensic errors that lead to acquittals, not from disclosure
mistakes.
Prosecutors might not invoke any of these explanations as a public
justification for eschewing measures to reduce the incidence of
disclosure error. Surely, they would not admit to being indifferent to
disclosure errors or to being afraid to make changes that would be
useful in reducing the risk of violating disclosure law. But one can
anticipate a raft of justifications that members of the DOJ task force or
other prosecutors might publicly offer for concluding that better
education about the law is good enough, and that mimicking businesses
or medical professionals is unnecessary. These include: (1) that current
disclosure practices and policies adequately protect against error; (2)
that the harm of disclosure error is insignificant; (3) that compliance
with disclosure obligations is relatively easy once one knows what the
obligations are; and (4) that disciplinary cases provide sufficient
information on which to predicate internal reform, insofar as reform is
necessary. These claims may have rhetorical appeal, particularly when
piled atop one another, but, as discussed below, none is especially
convincing.
57 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2008).
58 See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607-08 (1999).
59 See generally id.
60 Cf Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 2019 (noting that unlike in the medical
profession, where "all [professionals] have a shared goal of achieving patient wellness and
avoiding patient harm," participants in the criminal justice process (i.e., police, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges) "may have divergent motivations-even if all can agree that ... a
wrongful arrest or conviction is an event to be unequivocally avoided").
61 See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1144-47 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors seeking to convict
guilty defendants have no incentive to disclose Brady material).
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A. The Perceived Adequacy of Current Disclosure Practices
and Policies
Prosecutors may maintain that it is unnecessary to study
prosecutors' mistakes because there is no ultimate benefit to doing so;
discovery violations are rare, and as long as prosecutors know the law
and internal policy, errors will not occur. This argument is particularly
likely to be made in prosecutors' offices that have adopted internal
disclosure policies calling on prosecutors to provide the defense
considerably more information than the law requires. The theory is that
liberal disclosure policies guarantee that prosecutors make timely
disclosure of at least what the law requires-a theory that undoubtedly
fails in practice. 62 Relatedly, prosecutors may argue that the incidence
of discovery errors is insignificant and therefore too little would be
gained from examining mistakes to justify the resources.
The DOJ in particular may downplay the risk of discovery error,63
inclining for various reasons to assume that federal prosecutors are far
less likely than their state counterparts to violate disclosure
obligations. 64 After all, federal prosecutors' offices regard their lawyers
as the professional elite. They are generally able to hire better
credentialed lawyers because their work is regarded as more prestigious.
They do not have the crushing caseloads that might motivate some state
and local prosecutors to cut comers. They appear to be well-regulated
internally: The DOJ has an internal manual establishing policy on issues
that state and local prosecutors may decide on an ad hoc basis; the U.S.
Attorney's Office must have a lawyer responsible for ethics compliance;
and the DOJ offers guidance through its Professional Responsibility
Advisory Office and oversight through its Office of Professional
Responsibility, which investigates claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
Particularly when it comes to discovery obligations, however, the
assumption that federal prosecutors are professional exemplars may be
erroneous. To begin with, internal DOJ policy is far less generous than
many state prosecutors' policies. While federal prosecutors are
instructed to err on the side of disclosing Brady material, this is a far cry
from an "open file" policy that requires disclosing both favorable and
62 Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 531, 542-47 (2007) (identifying how prosecutors can subvert open file policies).
63 See Scarcella, supra note 9 (noting that in a speech in October 2009 on federal prosecutors'
disclosure obligations, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer "played down criticism that
prosecutor misconduct is widespread"); Ogden Memo re Summary of Actions, supra note 8, at I
("The Working Group's survey demonstrated that incidents of discovery failures are rare in
comparison to the number of cases prosecuted.").
64 See Zacharias & Green, supra note 32, at 216 ("[F]ederal prosecutors have long considered
themselves unique .... ").
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unfavorable information in the prosecutor's file. Further, federal law is
less demanding than most state laws, which means that federal
prosecutors are more likely than state prosecutors to have to decide
whether evidence or information must be disclosed as a matter of
minimal constitutional obligation under the Brady standard, whose
vagueness may invite incautious prosecutors to err on the side of
withholding. Federal prosecutors are also more likely than state
prosecutors to possess non-memorialized information that is
discoverable under Brady, because federal prosecutors spend more time
interviewing witnesses and preparing them to testify.
Claims about the frequency of disclosure error are hard to prove or
disprove, precisely because prosecutors have not systematically studied
their mistakes. No one else can do so, given that prosecutors ordinarily
have exclusive access to information needed to assess how and why-
and often whether-disclosure errors occurred. Some assume, however,
that prosecutors commonly violate the discovery obligations imposed
by law,65 and this perception is fueled by the recent high-profile cases in
which federal prosecutors' discovery mistakes came to light,6 6 as well
as by cases in which innocent defendants have been exonerated. 67
In the end, it seems only logical to assume that the cases of
disclosure error that have surfaced are just the tip of the iceberg, given
how difficult it is to discover such errors after-the-fact. 68 Unlike other
prosecutorial miscues, such as excessive jury arguments, discovery
violations are essentially invisible. There is little reason for these
violations ever to come to light. Consider, for example, a case where a
prosecutor or police officer conducts a pretrial interview with a key
prosecution witness who first exonerates but then inculpates the
defendant. The earlier statements must be disclosed to the defense
because they are both exculpatory and useful to impeach the witness.
But if the prosecutor or police officer does not write them down and
disclose or-at least-preserve the writing, it will be almost impossible
65 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 41, at 688 ("[Bly extrapolating from judicial decisions,
disclosures by the media, and anecdotal evidence, it is readily apparent that Brady violations are
among the most pervasive and recurring types of prosecutorial violations. Indeed, Brady may be
the paradigmatic example of prosecutorial misconduct.").
66 See, e.g., Amir Efrati, It's Rare for Prosecutors to Get the Book Thrown Back at Them,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2009, at A11.
67 See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHi. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1999, at 1; Gershman, supra note 41, at 686 n.8.
68 United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D. Mass. 2009) ("The reported cases are
not, however, a true measure of the scope of the problem, which it is impossible to measure
precisely. The defense is, by definition, unaware of exculpatory information that has not been
provided by the government. Although some information of this nature comes to light by chance
from time to time, it is reasonable to assume in other similar cases such information has never
come to light. There is, however, no way to determine how frequently this occurs."); see also
United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984).
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for the defense ever to learn that the statements were made. 69 Even if
the statements are memorialized, if the prosecution does not disclose
them, there is no process by which the writing will ordinarily come to
light.70
Once a proceeding ends-and most end rather quickly by way of
guilty plea-few defendants will have an attorney to seek new evidence.
In any case, defense counsel would not usually have access to
prosecutors' and investigators' files, much less to information that was
never memorialized. If defense counsel could not learn about the
undisclosed evidence or information before the defendant's conviction,
there are dim prospects for discovering it afterward.
Prosecutors' offices could test their assumption that discovery
errors are rare by randomly auditing prosecutors after they have
completed disclosure to determine whether their disclosure was
adequate under the law and office policy. 7' It is doubtful whether many
prosecutors' offices conduct such audits; certainly, they are not the
norm. Prosecutors might argue that the burden of proof should be on
defense lawyers who claim to be shortchanged. But as long as
prosecutors exclusively control the available evidence of their internal
practices, it seems reasonable to assume that discovery errors are
exponentially more common than the public record reveals.
B. The Perceived Insignificance of Disclosure Error
Prosecutors may argue that insofar as disclosure errors occur, their
impact is usually insignificant and hence unworthy of burdensome
efforts to reduce their incidence. Portraying disclosure obligations as
69 See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 224-25 (2d Cir. 2007) (declaring
that prosecutors have no constitutional obligation to take notes of witness interviews); Report of
the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 1981 (noting debate over whether prosecutors should take
notes of, or record, witness interviews); Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors Be Required to
Record Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 257 (2005) (arguing that prosecutors should be obligated to record witness
interviews to enable the defense to probe witnesses' credibility and thereby minimize the risk of
false convictions).
70 Prosecutors might preserve their files for possible post-conviction disclosure to the defense
and/or judicial review in cases where defendants maintain that they were wrongly convicted.
However, this is not the usual practice.
71 Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 2007. At the Symposium, the Working
Group on Systems and Culture discussed the possible utility of audits and noted:
[O]ne prosecutor in the group has already instituted a randomized interim audit system.
On an unannounced basis, an ADA is asked to bring all of his or her files to the section
chief, and to walk through each of them to explain past actions and future plans.
Disclosure of evidence is one topic that the section chief and the trial attorney discuss
during this spot check.
Id. at 2008; see also id. at 2024-27 (discussing the utility of audits both as mechanisms of
oversight and as data development tools).
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excessive and deviations from them as technical, prosecutors may point
to the many cases in which courts have held prosecutorial discovery
failures to be "harmless" or the undisclosed information to be
"immaterial."
However, given the number of exoneration cases marked by
prosecutors' disclosure errors, it is hard to downplay the importance of
seeking reasonable measures to improve prosecutors' disclosure
practices. Prosecutors' compliance with legal disclosure obligations is
not merely a technical requirement but goes to the integrity of the
criminal process. In the United States, a premium is placed on avoiding
convictions of innocent people, 72 and the traditional safeguard is a trial
at which defense counsel offers the best evidence and makes the best
arguments for why, at the very least, there is a reasonable doubt about
the defendant's guilt.
The defense lawyer's ability to test the prosecution's proof in an
adversarial setting depends crucially on the receipt of evidence and
information from the prosecution. Even if defense lawyers had
unlimited resources-which they do not-they might not be able to find
significant evidence and information helpful to a defense because
prosecution witnesses may be unwilling to cooperate with the defense
or because written material and physical evidence may exist nowhere
other than in government files. Further, procedural means of
discovering and developing information, such as witness depositions,
which are routinely available in civil litigation, are denied to defense
lawyers, in part out of considerations of cost and in large part to reduce
the risk of witness tampering and subornation of perjury. 73 And leaving
aside paper-intensive white-collar criminal prosecutions, the material
that must be disclosed in most criminal cases is likely to be more useful
than the voluminous materials disclosed in civil litigation, precisely
because the law is far more selective about what prosecutors must
disclose. In sum, if prosecutors do not comply with their legal
disclosure obligations, defense lawyers will not have the meaningful
ability to put the prosecution's proof to the test that our law presupposes
is essential to reliable trial outcomes.
Prosecutors' compliance with legal disclosure obligations is no less
essential to the integrity of the criminal proceedings that culminate in
guilty pleas, as most do.74  Even innocent defendants experience
72 See generally Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 51, at 505-07 (discussing prosecutors'
duty post-conviction to rectify wrongful convictions).
73 See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 714-18
(2006).
74 The relevant ABA ethics opinion, Opinion 09-454, places considerable weight on the
importance of prosecutorial disclosure prior to guilty pleas. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra
note 21; accord Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful
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enormous pressure to plead guilty because they know that criminal trials
can produce erroneous outcomes. For example, juries overvalue
eyewitness identifications; despite social science teachings and
anecdotal knowledge about the fallibility of identification evidence, 75
juries may credit the testimony of a single eyewitness whose professed
certainty about her identification is highly questionable.76 Further,
criminal defendants know that they will be sentenced more leniently if
they plead guilty than if they are found guilty by a jury. Unless the
prosecutor discloses both its own intended evidence and available
evidence and information that supports the defendant's innocence or
undermines the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, an innocent
defendant may rationally plead guilty for fear of an erroneous trial
outcome.
C. The Perceived Ease of Compliance
Prosecutors might assume that education about the disclosure law
and policy is an adequate measure to ensure compliance because once
you know what you are required to do in theory, it is easy to comply in
practice. The superficially objective and straightforward nature of some
discovery provisions may promote this assumption.
However, disclosure is not necessarily a simple task. 77 Prosecutors
may view pretrial disclosure as boring and ministerial, or as a nuisance
or distraction from the more exciting job of preparing a case for trial,
but compliance with the law calls for knowledge, skill, and judgment.
This is true even in jurisdictions where prosecutors approach disclosure
most generously. Prosecutors might vow to turn over every conceivably
relevant item that they possess, but not every relevant item necessarily
comes into their possession. Some "open file" policies have been called"open empty file" policies by defense lawyers who perceive that
available documents have not found their way into the prosecutor's file.
A prosecutor must understand the internal workings of investigative
Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 651 (2007). In contrast, the DOJ policy regards
prosecutorial disclosure as legally required and necessary only in cases that go to trial. U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2010).
75 See Michael H. Hofiheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identication
Evidence at Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1989); Michael R.
Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L.
909 (1995); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering
Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1487 (2008).
76 See, e.g., Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing trial court's findings
based upon claims of witness perury).
77 See Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 2021 (noting that many tasks
necessary to fulfill prosecutors' disclosure obligations are time-intensive, complex, and
"dependent upon a prosecutor's judgment").
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agencies and deal skillfully with investigators to recognize what
writings may exist and gain access to them.78 It may take particular
skill to extract exculpatory or impeaching information that an
investigator did not consign to writing. Further, disorganized
prosecutors may overlook items that they possess, and ill-trained
prosecutors may misunderstand the significance of items of which they
are aware, thereby failing to add them to the appropriate file.
Disclosure is even more complex in jurisdictions where
prosecutors seek merely to comply with their minimum legal
obligations-but not surpass them. Knowledge of Brady case law is
crucial to determining what favorable and impeaching material to
produce. But in many cases, the scope of the relevant law is contested
or its application is unclear.79 For example, the Supreme Court has said
that prosecutors must turn over favorable evidence only if it is"material"; but courts disagree about what materiality means and its
significance. 80 At best, materiality can be described only in vague terms
that leave much to prosecutors' judgment. Perhaps even more
importantly, prosecutors often need judgment and experience-not just
doctrinal knowledge-to recognize when information is favorable to the
defense or is useful for impeachment. Prosecutors with limited trial
experience may not perceive how information may be used
advantageously by defense counsel. Likewise, courts hold that
prosecutors are not accountable for withholding favorable evidence that
the defense could have learned on its own through the exercise of due
diligence. 81 Prosecutors may need a sophisticated understanding of the
defense's capabilities and resources to make a reliable judgment about
whether they can lawfully take advantage of this limitation. Finally,
when prosecutors seek to do little more than to toe the line, even the
most skillful, knowledgeable, and well-intentioned among them may
step over the line because of unconscious biases and ordinary human
imperfection. 82
78 See id. at 2002 ("[A] functional working relationship between prosecutors and law
enforcement is essential to effective discovery practices.").
79 See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 93,
94-107 (2004).
80 See supra note 16.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 937 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davis,
787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1986).
82 For discussions of the influence of cognitive bias on prosecutorial disclosure in particular,
see Alafair Burke, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 575 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J.
481 (2009). For discussions of the role of cognitive bias in various aspects of prosecutorial
decision making, see, for example, Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor
and Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475 (2006). See also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006);
Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U J.L. &
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D. The Perceived Adequacy of Disciplinary Mechanisms
Prosecutors' offices may also assume that internal and external
disciplinary mechanisms are adequate to reveal problems that can be
addressed through systemic reform. After all, disclosure violations may
trigger disciplinary investigations, which will disclose cases where
prosecutors innocently erred, on one hand, or engaged in willful
misconduct, on the other. Prosecutors' offices, in theory, can learn from
these examples. In particular, the DOJ might repose faith in
disciplinary mechanisms since the DOJ has a highly professional office,
the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), dedicated to
investigating misconduct by federal prosecutors.
In general, reliance on disciplinary mechanisms as a source of
learning would be misplaced. State disciplinary authorities rarely
sanction prosecutors publicly for wrongdoing in general or for
wrongdoing in connection with their disclosure obligations in
particular,83 and the cases involving public sanctions are generally
limited to cases of willful and egregious misconduct. 84  In most
jurisdictions, disciplinary agencies keep their findings and files
confidential except when they issue public sanctions. Therefore,
disciplinary cases are not a source of learning in the cases where
prosecutors committed error but not sanctionable misconduct. Further,
even in the rare disciplinary case in which a prosecutor is publicly
sanctioned, disciplinary agencies make no effort to look at the root
causes of disclosure violations or how they may be avoided through
better institutional practices. In theory, disciplinary agencies could
sanction chief prosecutors and supervisory prosecutors who fail to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that junior prosecutors comply with their
LIBERTY 512 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WiS. L. REV. 291 (2006); Green &
Yaroshefsky, supra note 51; Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of
Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence,
70 UMKC L. REV. 847 (2002).
83 Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take
Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001).
84 The most highly publicized example is the disbarment of North Carolina prosecutor
Michael Nifong for prosecutorial misconduct, including withholding DNA evidence, in
connection with the prosecution of members of the Duke University lacrosse team. See Excerpt
Transcript, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, N.C. State Bar v.
Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm'n of N.C. State Bar June 16,
2007). For other examples in which prosecutors were disciplined for discovery violations, see
ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 21, at 2 n.6.
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disclosure obligations.85 For example, disciplinary agencies might rely
on evidence adduced in civil rights cases against municipalities that
suggests prosecutors received inadequate training regarding their Brady
obligations. 86 But there is no indication that any prosecutor has been
disciplined for failing to maintain adequate disclosure policies. 87
The DOJ's reliance on the OPR in particular would be misplaced.
The OPR's annual reports suggest that it looks at only a handful of
cases a year in which disclosure questions are raised. Like state
disciplinary agencies, its objective is not to improve institutional
practices by examining why individual prosecutors err but to investigate
sanctionable misconduct. The OPR's annual reports suggest that it
focuses on compliance with the law and legal ethics rules, not internal
DOJ policy. 88 While it sometimes concludes that the prosecutor in
question exercised poor judgment, 89 there is no evidence that it
undertakes inquiries based on allegations of mere imprudence. 90 The
opacity of its work undermines whatever pedagogic value its
determinations might otherwise have.91
85 See ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 21, at 1, 8; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1
(2002).
86 See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (upholding jury
finding that the New Orleans Prosecutor's Office provided inadequate training regarding
prosecutors' disclosure obligations), cert. granted in part, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).
87 Little is known about internal discipline in state and local prosecutors' offices, and whether
and how offices sanction their prosecutors formally or informally for disclosure violations.
However, evidence adduced in a civil rights action based on an alleged pattern of disclosure
violations in the Bronx County District Attorney's Office in New York indicated that, at least in
that office, during a substantial period of time there was no effective internal discipline. See
Yaroshefsky, supra note 83, at 280-82 ("[One Bronx] prosecutor, who bad been named by courts
in four cases for misconduct, was suspended for four weeks and lost two weeks' pay. [But] after
he returned to the office, he was granted a bonus, followed by a series of merit increases during
the pendency of his case before the disciplinary committee.").
88 The office's mandate is to investigate "allegations of misconduct involving [DOJ]
attorneys that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or provide legal
advice." 28 C.F.R. § 0.39a(a)(l) (2009). Only a small percentage of investigated allegations of
misconduct involves noncompliance with DOJ rules and regulations. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 8 (2008) (reporting
that only four percent of new investigations in 2008 involved alleged failures to comply with DOJ
rules and regulations); cf Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
"Discretionary Justice, " 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 186-89 (2004).
89 See Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 285-86
(2001).
90 According to a recent memorandum, OPR investigations may result in only "two types of
misconduct fmdings"-a fmding of intentional misconduct or a finding of reckless misconduct.
Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen., Memorandum of Decision
Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of
Professional Responsibility's Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced
Interrogation" Techniques on Suspected Terrorists 11 (Jan. 5, 2010).
91 See Bruce A. Green, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Let There Be Light, 118 YALE L.J.
(POCKET PART) 156 (2009).
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From the perspective of improving policies and practices, the
OPR's work is at best unproductive and potentially counterproductive.
The OPR focuses on individual prosecutors' alleged wrongdoing, not on
office systems and culture. It seeks to weed out the few bad apples
within the prosecutorial corps rather than help well-intentioned
prosecutors improve their practices. At the same time, the threat of
internal discipline (as well as the risk of being referred to external
disciplinary agencies if the OPR concludes that misconduct clearly
occurred) may very well tend to discourage prosecutors from discussing
and seeking feedback on potential disclosure errors after they occur.
Indeed, on top of the ordinary concern about potential embarrassment,
the threat of discipline may motivate a federal prosecutor to conceal
problematic behavior. And when, as in the Ted Stevens prosecution,
federal prosecutors become subjects of a disciplinary investigation, they
may not cooperate as candidly and extensively as necessary to best use
the case as a subject of study and education.
II. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
In certain areas, such as the sentencing of criminal defendants and
the conditions of their reentry into society upon their release, the DOJ's
current administration seeks to develop and analyze data in order to
develop policy based on evidence-not intuition, anecdote, or wishful
thinking. In theory, it could easily do so with respect to disclosure
policy as well. But one can imagine various challenges for the DOJ, as
well as for state and local prosecutors' offices, in seeking to establish a
process of identifying potential discovery errors, studying them, and
learning how to implement better policies and practices. As discussed
below, these include: (1) the difficulty of obtaining necessary data;
(2) the need to avoid discouraging prosecutors from correcting their
mistakes; and (3) the difficulty of studying a prosecutor's conduct while
a case is ongoing.
A. Finding Relevant Data
One difficulty would be collecting data,92 beginning with
identifying cases for study. For medical professionals, cases of
potential error present themselves fairly clearly: Patients get sick or die.
92 See Report of the Working Groups, supra note 18, at 2019 ("[W]hile the medical field has
collected a significant amount of data on incidents of errors in patient care, the criminal justice
system has little in the way of analogous empirical knowledge of the prevalence of discovery
errors .... [and is therefore] less able to fashion evidence-based rules and practices .... ").
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In contrast, as previously noted, most cases of discovery error probably
never see the light of day. Further, potential medical errors are likely to
be discovered relatively soon after they occur. The same is not true of
prosecutors' disclosure errors. They may come to light, if at all, only
long after they occur.93 By that time, the prosecutor in question may
have left the office and may be uninterested in reconstructing why
particular material was withheld. Even if the prosecutor is cooperative,
her memory may have diminished too much to be helpful. These
considerations suggest the value of auditing prosecutors' files while
cases are ongoing rather than relying exclusively on cases in which
courts have found that discovery violations occurred.94
Additionally, prosecutors can widen their net by examining cases
as soon as disclosure questions are raised in them, regardless of how the
questions may eventually be resolved. Disclosure questions arise at all
stages, including pre-trial when defense lawyers object that prosecutors
are withholding necessary information, and during trial when defense
lawyers make similar arguments or maintain that a new production of
evidence was not sufficiently timely. Prosecutors need not limit
themselves to cases in which defense lawyers learn of material that was
not previously produced and seek to set aside the defendant's conviction
on the ground that the material should have been produced for use in
connection with the trial.
Relatedly, offices might have difficulty eliciting what prosecutors
did and why. Prosecutors may be disposed to put their conduct in the
best light, or even to give a false account. This problem is obviously
intertwined with the nature of the review and the office culture
generally. Ideally, inquiries will proceed in a non-punitive atmosphere
in which prosecutors will not suffer for reconstructing events as they
occurred. Preferably, the office would employ measures other than
some of the more intimidating ones by which it often seeks to get at the
truth.
B. Promoting Self-Corrective Measures
Another challenge would be to establish a review process that does
not motivate prosecutors to conceal their errors. 95 It is obviously
important that prosecutors come forward when they discover that they
93 See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 313 n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) ("[M]any Brady
violations are not uncovered until years after the event, if they are ever uncovered.").
94 See supra note 71 (noting two Working Groups at the Symposium that recommended
auditing prosecutors' discovery decisions while cases are ongoing).
95 Cf Zacharias & Green, supra note 55, at 41-42 (discussing the risk that exposure to
disciplinary sanctions will discourage prosecutors from correcting wrongful convictions).
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previously failed to make complete disclosure. An institutional review
process that embarrasses prosecutors or that leads to punishment would
discourage prosecutors from doing so.
However, whether an internal review process will add to
prosecutors' ordinary incentive to bury mistakes is questionable. To be
sure, prosecutors will already be concerned that coming clean might
lead to embarrassment, judicial opprobrium, or discipline. That said, it
should be possible to construct a process for learning from error that
avoids embarrassing or stigmatizing prosecutors, that encourages
admissions of error, and, further, that preserves collegiality. Businesses
have developed legal compliance programs and other programs that
study errors in order to make improvements. Surely, prosecutors'
offices are equally capable of developing methods of learning from
mistakes without undermining the offices' culture and work.
C. Maintaining Prosecutions While Investigating Error
Perhaps the most interesting challenge would be to reconcile the
interest in identifying and learning from error with the aim of preserving
just convictions in cases where prosecutors complied with their legal
obligations or their noncompliance was legally harmless. This is a
challenge unlike those faced by medical professionals seeking to build a
process to learn from medical error. Studying medical error does not
interfere with the core mission of curing the patient. Particularly when
the patient is deceased, medical care is over. At the time of alleged
prosecutorial error, in contrast, the prosecution may be ongoing. That
creates two problems: First, timely internal review of the prosecutor's
conduct may appear to undermine the goal of securing or upholding a
just conviction; and second, concern about securing or upholding the
conviction may undermine the objectivity and completeness of the
review.
For example, suppose that on appeal from a criminal conviction,
the defendant argues that the prosecution failed to comply with its
discovery obligations-that the prosecution withheld favorable
evidence until mid-trial, by which time it was too late for the defense to
make effective use of it. If the claim is credible, it provides what some
might describe as a "teachable moment" for the prosecutor who tried the
case and for the office. It offers an occasion to consider whether the
prosecutor's conduct was both lawful and desirable. If the prosecutor
acted poorly, the case provides a vehicle for encouraging more desirable
conduct on the part of the particular prosecutor and other prosecutors in
the office. It also provides an opportunity to consider whether the
prosecutor's undesirable conduct was attributable, at least in part, to
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inadequate training or supervision, or to deficiencies in office culture or
policy. The office might consider whether institutional practices can be
improved to make it more likely that individual prosecutors will act
more desirably in the future.
In the context of the appeal, however, the office will be strongly
motivated to defend the conviction and, in doing so, to defend the
prosecution's discovery decision if at all possible. Ordinarily, the office
will have brought the case because it believed the defendant was guilty,
and the jury's verdict will only strengthen that belief. If possible, it will
want to preserve the conviction to avoid the burden on witnesses and
the expenditure of resources that would result from a retrial, as well as
to avoid the risk of an acquittal the second time around. Strategically,
the office may perceive that its success on appeal would be undermined
by conceding that the trial prosecutor acted improperly, and, in any
event, viewed through an adversarial lens, the office is more likely than
an objective observer to believe sincerely that the conduct was indeed
proper. Further, it might be perceived as disloyal, and undermine office
morale generally, to fail to defend the prosecutor's potentially
defensible conduct.
Should the office view the prosecutor's conduct objectively and
use the Brady claim as an opportunity for both the trial prosecutor and
the office at large to think about how to improve their practices?
Should the office defend the prosecutor's conduct zealously on appeal,
thereby potentially sending a signal to the prosecutor and the office that
discovery practices like those undertaken in the case are perfectly fine?
Can the office conceivably do both at once?
Ideally, an effective review process can be designed not only to
avoid interfering with the prosecution but to promote a fair resolution.
Prosecutors' offices should recognize that both their short-range and
long-range interests may be promoted by contemporaneously reviewing
challenged disclosure decisions as objectively and completely as
possible and by giving the court a candid accounting of the prosecutor's
decision-making process in the context of the case. If a prosecutor's
conduct is believed to be both lawful and desirable, the office should
obviously defend it. If the prosecutor's conduct fell short because it
departed from law or office policy, the office should make available
arguments for defending the conviction without defending the conduct
in question at the same time. In the short term, saying mea culpa may
be an effective strategy. Admitting that the failure to disclose evidence
was imprudent or contrary to office policy gives away nothing.
Conceding legal error may sacrifice an arguable legal ground for
defending the conviction but will reduce the court's inclination to
overturn the conviction to teach the prosecutor or her office a lesson. In
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the long term, candidly accounting for error will enhance the office's
credibility with the court and the public.
Further, recognizing that candor is in the office's interest will help
facilitate the effort to review disclosure decisions objectively rather than
in the most favorable light.96 That is also in the office's long-term
interest, because an office that learns from its discovery mistakes will
make fewer mistakes in the future.
CONCLUSION
The exoneration cases may have led the public to believe that
prosecutors' failure to comply with their discovery obligations was
primarily a problem in state court. But recently, federal prosecutors
have come under fire for failing to comply with disclosure obligations
in a series of high-profile cases. In response, the new DOJ
administration resolved to reexamine how federal prosecutors and their
offices meet these obligations. So far, however, its response has been
modest, particularly given how conservative its disclosure policies are
as compared to those of many state prosecutors' offices. The DOJ has
put its faith in better training of prosecutors about their legal
obligations, eschewing a host of additional measures. Critics might
note the irony that the DOJ expects strong legal compliance programs
from private institutions while holding itself to a relatively low standard
when it comes to institutional compliance with prosecutorial disclosure
obligations. 97
Given the importance of prosecutorial disclosure to ensuring
reliable outcomes in criminal cases, prosecutors' offices should try
harder to understand why their prosecutors sometimes err and to
develop measures to reduce the risk of error. Given its superior
resources and pride of place among prosecutors' offices nationally, the
DOJ should take the lead. Experience in other contexts suggests that
one of the most effective ways to learn how to do better would be to
systematically examine prosecutors' mistakes. Notwithstanding various
challenges, it should be feasible for prosecutors' offices to conduct such
studies as a prelude to implementing institutional reform. In any event,
there is no persuasive reason not to try.
96 Obviously, other measures should also be taken to promote an unbiased review of the
prosecutor's conduct, including not only developing a non-retributive culture but also assigning
principal responsibility for the process to prosecutors who are not involved in the prosecution and
are otherwise as detached as possible.
97 Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2089, 2104-05 (2010).
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